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CASE COMMENTS
Yet under local law in Illinois some source of authority is neces-
sary before the consular agent can exercise the election privilege
of his national to avoid a will. In the principal case there was no
showing that the beneficiary was incompetent so as to justify ap-
pointment of the consul as guardian. Nor could the consular agent
communicate with his national; thus he could receive no personal
authorization as a power of attorney. There were no treaty pro-
vision giving the Lithuanian consul the power to act for his national
in electing to avoid a will. The only possible source of authority
would have been the inherent powers of a consul under principles
of international law. However, the Illinois court in the instant case
dismissed this possible source of authority by saying no right of
election cases were found in which the consul's authority was recog-
nized without (1) a treaty or (2) an express power of attorney
from his national. Apparently, the Illinois court found inapplicable
the principles set forth in The Bello Corrune, supra and later cases
applying these principles. Moreover, the Illinois court considered
the relations between the de facto and the de jure governments and
the fact that the consular agent of the de jure government would
probably be unable to distribute the beneficiary's share if he were
allowed to recover it. Considerations which distinguish between
de facto and de jure governments are said to be political rather
than judicial. Bmccs, THE LAw oF NAaioNs 129 (2d ed. 1952).
Later cases indicate a tendency to distinguish between acts political
in nature and those personal in nature in situations involving de jure
and de facto governments. The courts will consider cases of a
personal nature but state those involving political questions to be
beyond their reach. In re Alexandravicus, 83 N.J. Super. 303, 199
A.2d 662 (1964). Whether equitable considerations will override
considerations based on principles of international law is in the
court's discretion. The court in the principal case leaned toward
equitable considerations.
Hazel Armenta Straub
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy
D was indicted in New York for murder in the first degree and
was thrice tried in the state courts on the same indictment. The jury
in the first trial found D guilty of second degree murder. Following
a reversal, D was tried under the same indictment and found guilty
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of murder in the first degree. D obtained a reversal and was tried
for the third time for first degree murder under the original indict-
ment and was found guilty of second degree murder. D contended
it was unconstitutional for the state to prosecute him for first degree
murder subsequent to the first trial, and that the prosecution for
first degree murder so tainted the third trial as to render it constitu-
tionally inadequate. The lower court denied D's application for a
writ of habeas corpus. Held, reversed. The due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment imposes some limitations on the
power of the states to reprosecute an individual for the same crime.
United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
The decision in the principal case charts a new area of law in-
volving the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court has not invalidated any conviction obtained in state
courts on grounds that the state has transgressed the federal con-
stitutional limitations on its power to reprosecute an individual for
the same crime. But the instant case relates the fifth amendment's
double jeopardy prohibition to similar prohibitions derived from
state laws. Implicit is the holding that the fourteenth amendment
entrusts the federal courts with a responsibility and power to decide
which reprosecutions by a state violate basic notions of justice.
The court in the principal case drew its authority for the existence
of federal constitutional limitations on a state's power to reprosecute
an individual from two sources: (1) the premises and presumptions
revealed in those Supreme Court cases in which a double jeopardy
claim was interposed against a state and (2) from the doctrine of
selective incorporation. The selective incorporation doctrine in-
volves the absorption of the fundamental gurantees of the Bill of
Rights by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
thus makes the guarantee applicable to the states.
The Supreme Court for years avoided the question of whether
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment curbed the
powers of the states to reprosecute. Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616 (1912); Shoener v. Pennsylvania, 207 U.S. 188 (1907);
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902). However, in Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court was unable to avoid the
question any longer. The complainant in Palko challenged the
power of a state to appeal from a judgment of conviction for a
lesser degree of homicide than that charged in the indictment and
[Vol. 08
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to reprosecute him for the greater degree upon obtaining a reversal.
The Palko opinion said that the fourteenth amendment does not
guarantee against state action all that would be a violation of the
original Bill of Rights if done by the federal government, and that
the fourteenth amendment is not to be taken as embodying the
double jeopardy prohibitions of the fifth amendment. Therefore,
since the double jeopardy provision was not included within the
meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
it did not bind the states. Other cases following the holding of the
Palko case. Bartkus v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 907 (1958); Brack v. North
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1952); Gryger v. Burke, 344 U.S. 728
(1948).
By the doctrine of selective incorporation the Supreme Court has
held in effect that certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been
absorbed by the fourteenth amendment and are thereby made ap-
plicable to the states. Among decisions in point are: Pointer v.
Texas, 85 Sup. Ct. 1065 (1965) (confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(the first amendment); Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to counsel); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (the fourth amendment); Chicago, B. & 0. R.R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment).
The court in the principal case suggested three alternative stan-
dards for determining which state reprosecutions transgress the
limitations imposed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Two of these, the federal standard and the hard core
standard, would make the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment applicable to the states by absorption under the doctrine
of selective incorporation. The third standard suggested is the
fundamental fairness standard, which does not require reference
to the fifth amendment, and which presumably would impose some
restrictions on state reprosecutions even if there were no federal
Bill of Rights.
Under the federal standard, the state would be held to the same
minimum standards as is the central government in similar federal
19661
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prosecutions. To test the propriety of a state reprosecution, the
courts would look to the entire body of federal case law interpreting
and applying the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment
and be guided accordingly.
Under the hard core standard, the states still would be prohibited
from subjecting a person to double jeopardy, but the states' prac-
tices and procedures would not have to conform precisely with
federal practices and procedure, so long as the state's practices were
designed to accomplish substantially the same end result.
The concept of the hard core standard is at first rather difficult to
grasp. Indeed, as the court observed in the principal case, "there
is a serious question as to whether the doctrine of selective incorpo-
ration permits two levels of selection-absorption of only those
provisions of the Bill of Rights that are fundamental, and then
absorption of only that part of the provision that is fundamental,
its basic core." Nevertheless, there can be found language in previ-
ous Supreme Court opinions suggesting that certain technical ram-
ifications may in some instances justify such a double standard.
E.g., Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 435 (1953) (Dissenting
opinion of Vinson, C. J.).
The third alternative suggested by the principal case is the funda-
mental fairness standard. Here the courts would not necessarily
concern themselves with whether the double jeopardy provision of
the fifth amendment had been absorbed through the fourteenth
amendment. The sole test would be the application of the court's
somewhat vague and shifting definitions of due process to the
particular case at hand. Phrases such as "concepts of ordered
justice," "conduct which shocks the conscience," and "fundamental-
ly unfair" would be employed to guide the court. Federal cases
applying the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment
would not be binding precedent, but like those cases applying
double jeopardy provisions derived from state law, would be en-
titled to weighty consideration.
The court in the principal case found it both undesirable and
unnecessary to choose among these alternative standards, as this
dimension of constitutional law is being reconsidered and refash-
ioned by the Supreme Court, and the only advantage from choosing
among the standards would be to serve as a guide for other lower
courts. The court's ruling, however, in effect held that under any
[Vol. 68
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of the three alternative standards the conclusion was unavoidable
that New York transgressed the federal constitutional limitations
on its power to reprosecute an individual for the same crime.
In a 1957 case with a factual pattern readily comparable to the
principal case, except that it involved reprosecution under federal
law by the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court held that such
a reprosecution violated the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); see 60
W. VA. L. BEv. 281 (1958). Incident to successive reprosecutions for
first degree murder, the Green case by way of the federal standard
would be ample viable precedent to support the constitutional chal-
lenge of the principal case.
The court in the principal case is suggesting that the Palko case
may no longer be the law, even though Palko has not yet been
repudiated by the Supreme Court. The principal case has set forth
some suggested bases to answer whether the fourteenth amend-
ment limits a state's power to reprosecute an individual, but the
final decision to the question remains to be answered by the
Supreme Court.
West Virginia forbids double jeopardy by article III, section 5 of
its constitution, which provides that no person shall "... be twice
put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense." The phras-
ing of West Virginia's double jeopardy provision is the same as in
the states of Texas, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Miss-
issippi; it is quite similar to that of the federal constitution which
provides: ".... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
If the decision and reasoning of the principal case are later
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, the question may
arise as to whether West Virginia's double jeopardy provision will
satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
1953 the West Virginia Supreme Court was faced with a situation
similar to the principal case. In the West Virginia case the defend-
ant was indicted for rape but was convicted of attempted rape.
The court held that in a new trial, the defendant could not be
found guilty of rape as charged in the original indictment because
the jury had in effect acquitted him of that offense. The defendant
therefore could not be tried for a crime greater than that of at-
tempted rape. State v. Franklin, 139 W. Va. 43, 79 S.E.2d 629
1966]
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(1953). In State v. Wisman, 98 W. Va. 250, 126 S.E. 703 (1925),
it was held error to refuse the instruction that one cannot be found
guilty of any offense higher or greater than that offense found by
the first jury. This same principle was applied in Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), principally the case from which the
reasoning was drawn in reaching the decision in the instant case.
The Green case followed the view that is most consistent with
the philosophy of the criminal law in not subjecting the defendant
to repeated abuse and embarrassment, and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of insecurity and anxiety.
The principal case illustrates the growing concern of the federal
judiciary with the standards of criminal practice and procedure
in the state courts. In view of the Supreme Court's present disposi-
tion to broaden the scope of the federal Bill of Rights so as to
embrace more and more state actions, it would appear prudent for
all state courts, prosecutors and law enforcement officials to follow
closely the established federal procedures. The failure to do so
carries with it the strong possibility of future reversals and the un-
necessary release of hardened criminals.
John I. Rogers, 1I
Constitutional Law-Voluntary Confession
D had confessed to being guilty of rape. At his trial the deter-
mination of the voluntariness of his confession was made by the
jury. He appealed on the ground that this procedure violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Held, affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the due
process clause as requiring the judge to make a determination of the
voluntariness of the confession. However, Georgia law, which vests
the trial judge with unquestionable power to review the case after
conviction and to set aside the verdict if he is not satisfied with it,
completely fulfills this requirement. Justice Almand, dissenting,
stated that the procedure followed in this case is exactly the same
as the procedure held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Sims v. State, 144 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 1965).
It is clear under the fourteenth amendment that a conviction
cannot stand if it was based on evidence which included an invol-
untary confession. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
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